The autonomy of the common law of the contract of employment from the general law of contract by Brodie, Douglas
Brodie, Douglas (2016) The autonomy of the common law of the contract 
of employment from the general law of contract. In: The Contract of 
Employment. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 124-144. ISBN 
9780198783169 , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/67054/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
1 
 
1 
 
Chapter Six   
Introduction  
 
This chapter addresses the relationship between the general principles of contract law and the more 
specific rules pertaining to the employment contract. The topic is not simply a matter of academic 
interest. It is important that we understand whether further evolution of the employment contract will 
be informed by those general principles or a self-contained body of rules. The dynamics of the rule 
creation process need to be fully understood. The subject is sometimes addressed on the basis that the 
paramount question is whether the law of the employment contract should be viewed as an instance of 
general contractual principles or would be better seen as a discrete body of law: C$FHQWUDOGLOHPPD«LV
WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK>WKH@«ODZVKRXOGRQWKHRQHKDQGERUURZIURPWKHJHQHUDOODZRIFRQWUDFW
applicable to commercial and consumer contracts, and on the other, differentiate itself from those 
JHQHUDOUXOHVLQRUGHUWRWDLORUDVSHFLDOODZIRUWKHFRQWUDFWRIHPSOR\PHQW·1 This CFHQWUDOGLOHPPD·is 
somewhat unhelpful as neither depiction is wholly explicatory. Many of the rules of the employment 
contract are certainly applications of general principles but, as is the case with all nominate contracts, 
instances exist of modifications or exceptions. No less significant is the manner in which such 
modifications and exceptions are likely to evolve and impact on other types of contract or indeed 
contract law as a whole.  
By addressing this set of questions, this chapter takes further the set of inquiries which were opened up 
in the first three chapters of this work.  For it was central to those inquiries to consider how far and in 
what sense we should regard the law of the contract of employment as being distinctive from the law 
of contracts in general.  In particular we need to ask whether and how far the set of core structural 
principles of the law of the contract of employment, which were articulated in chapter 2 and further 
developed in chapter 3, mark out the law of the contract of employment as being autonomous of the 
¶JHQHUDOODZRIFRQWUDFW·DQGPRUHRYHUDVEHLQJGLIIHUHQWO\FRQVWUXFWHGHYHQIURPRWKHUNLQGVRI
personal work contract.   
 
The Pluralism of Contract Law 
 
It is important to stress at the outset that the general principles/particular rules dichotomy is 
                                                          
1 , ?ŽůůŝŶƐ ?ǭŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ŝŶ ?ŽŐŐĞƚĂů ?ĞĚ ? ?The Autonomy of Labour Law  (Hart: 2015) at 46.   
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something of a false one in that contract law sets out to provide a framework within which rules 
appropriate to the varying circumstances and specific needs of nominate contracts can develop. It may 
be claimed that notions of pluralism underpin the general principles of contract law. Over the last 
thirty or so years the changes to the content of the employment contract that have occurred have been 
very significant and some of the more recently created implied terms in law can be viewed, perfectly 
correctly, as evidence of a profound change in the judicial view of the employment relationship.2 What 
is not always appreciated is the extent to which changes in the general contractual framework have 
facilitated this. Up until the decision of the House of Lords in Liverpool CC v Irwin it could have been 
said with a strong measure of justification that the test for LPSOLFDWLRQZDVCQHFHVVLW\· even where 
default rules were concerned.3 Of late it has been accepted by the judiciary that the "necessity" involved 
in implying terms such as mutual trust and confidence is "somewhat protean".4 Fortunately, there is 
now acceptance that `to some extent at least, the existence and scope of standardised implied terms 
raise questions of reasonableness, fairness and the balancing of competing policy considerations."5 
Irwin concerned the landlord and tenant relationship and cogently demonstrates the impact that such 
an approach can have when judicial deliberations take account of social policy.6 There the House of 
Lords implied a term that the landlord was required to take reasonable care of the common parts of 
the property, such as lifts, stairwells and rubbish chutes.  As Atiyah has pointed out such an outcome 
could hardly be said to be based on a test of necessity.7 By way of contrast it is striking to note that in 
Australia a successful attempt was made in Commonwealth Bank v Barker to deny the existence of the 
implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence on the basis that it is not necessary to the 
functioning of the employment relationship.8  The High Court applying the test set out in Byrne v 
Australian Airlines that absent the implication, "the enjoyment of the rights conferred by the contract 
would or could be rendered nugatory, worthless, or, perhaps, be seriously undermined" or the contract 
would be "deprived of its substance, seriously undermined or drastically devalued".9 Such a rigorous 
test for implication is favoured as a means of excluding consideration of the policy concerns that have 
                                                          
2In Johnson v Unisys [2003] 1 AC 518 Lord Hoffmann observed that `over the last 30 years or so, the nature of 
the contract of employment has been tUDQVIRUPHG«7KHFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHFRPPRQODZWRWKHHPSOR\PHQW
revolution has been by the evolution of implied terms in the contract of employment. The most far reaching is 
WKHLPSOLHGWHUPRIWUXVWDQGFRQILGHQFH%XWWKHUHKDYHEHHQRWKHUV¶ 
3 Liverpool CC v Irwin [1977] AC 239. 
4 Crossley v Faithful and Gould Holdings Ltd [2004] IRLR 377.  
5 Crossley v Faithful and Gould Holdings Ltd (n 4). In Societe Generale v Geys [2013] 1 AC 523 Lady Hale 
endorsed this dictum: `There is much to be said for that approach, given the way in which those terms have 
GHYHORSHGRYHUWKH\HDUV¶ 
6 Liverpool CC v Irwin (n 3).  
7 P.S.Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law on Contract, .  
8 Commonwealth Bank v Barker [2014] HCA 32.  
9 (1995) 185 CLR 410.  
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informed the development of the implied term in other jurisdictions.10 It then becomes easier to cleave 
to the position that, at some level at least, the contract functions perfectly adequately in the absence of 
the term. Such an approach is also said to accord with the proper scope of judicial law-making which 
should `only be exercised as an incident of the adjudication of particular disputes.·11 It is difficult to see 
that the claimant in Irwin would have been successful on the foregoing approach but in England, in 
contrast to Australia, the law on the creation of default rules has moved closer to the approach in the 
law of negligence where, in the application of the test articulated in Caparo Industries v Dickman, policy 
factors help determine whether it is fair just and reasonable to impose a duty of care.12 Had it not been 
for Irwin a far more cautious approach might have continued to be taken in the employment context 
DQGWKHCHPSOR\PHQWUHYROXWLRQ·ZRXOGQRWKDYHFRPHDERXW at common law.  
 
Implied terms LQODZSURYLGHDQH[FHOOHQWLOOXVWUDWLRQRIFRQWUDFWODZ·VFDSDFLW\WRSURYLGHUHVSRQVHV
which are nuanced to the circumstances of particular contracts. Such terms aim to reflect the `inherent 
nature of a contract and of the relationship thereby establisheG·13 The general law sets out uniform 
criteria which must be satisfied before an implied term in law can be established but the impact on the 
content of different types of contract may be very different even though the issue to be addressed is 
broadly similar. The flexibility in the legal framework extends to the needs of a sub-division of a 
nominate contract. In University of Western Australia v Gray the Australian Federal Court recognised that 
while one type of term may quite appropriately be implied in a class of contract cast in very general 
terms: `e.g. in a contract of employment the employee's duty to obey lawful and reasonable directions 
given by the employer that fall within the scope of the emplR\PHQW«DQRWKHUWHUPPD\EHRIVXFKD
character as to be implied only into a recognisable sub-category of that larger class.· 14 Sim v Rotherham 
MBC, where it was held that a school teacher owed an implied contractual duty to discharge their 
professional obligations, may be seen in this light.15 Scally v Southern Health Board provides a further 
example; there it was held that where a contract of employment negotiated between employers and a 
representative body contained a particular term conferring on the employee a valuable right contingent 
upon his acting as required to obtain the benefit, of which he could not be expected to be aware unless 
the term was brought to his attention, there was an implied obligation on the employer to take 
                                                          
10 The implication in Malik was seen by the High Court in Barker (n 8) as contingent upon a view being taken 
CRIVRFLDOFRQGLWLRQVDQGGHVLUDEOHVRFLDOSROLF\¶ F. Reynold, `Bad behaviour and the implied term of mutual 
trust and confidence: is there a problem"¶ (2015) 44 ILJ 262, 269 argues that `the objections raised in Barker to 
WKHLPSOLFDWLRQRIWKHWHUPGRDSSHDUWRKDYHFRQVLGHUDEOHVXEVWDQFH¶,GRnot agree.    
11 Barker (n 8) 19. 
12  Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. 
13 Liverpool CC v Irwin  ( n 3). 
14 [2009] FCAFC 116. 
15 Sim v Rotherham [1987] Ch 216. 
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reasonable steps to publicise that term.16 In addition, the application of identically worded obligations 
may vary; an open-textured obligation of fair dealing may impose different requirements in the 
SHQVLRQV·FRQWH[WUDWKHUWKDQWKHHPSOR\PHQW17 The contemporary contextual approach to 
construction is also premised on the desirability of diversity of outcomes: `the factual matrix in which 
the [employment] contract is cast is not ordinarily the same as that of an arms'-length commercial 
FRQWUDFW·18 The significance of this point will be imperfectly understood unless it is remembered that 
the factual matrix has a normative element. Fundamental implied terms expound the judicial vision of  
appropriate behaviour in the context of employment relations. Such implied terms function as aids to 
interpretation.19  
 
In the result, under a general framework, obligations dealing with the same issue (e.g. allocation of risk) 
may be framed and/or applied differently depending upon the context. This measure of autonomy is 
consistent with the integrity of a scheme of overarching principles but also of contracts being aligned 
with and underpinned by differing sets of values. For instance, under the employment contract the 
employee has an implied right to be given actual work to do in certain (highly specific) circumstances.20 
It is unlikely that such implication would occur in other types of contract for the provision of work 
where the relationship is viewed as less personal in nature; there the wRUNHU·VLQWHUHVWZRXOGEHYLHZHG
as purely pecuniary.    
 
Modifying the General Framework  
The courts will also, on occasion, modify or create exceptions to general principles to meet the 
demands of a particular nominate contract.21 For instance, during the 1980s and 1990s a significant 
number of cases emerged where the employer's right to exercise clear, express powers under an 
employment contract was held to be subject to either the implied obligation of trust and confidence22 or to 
notions of reasonableness.23 At the time this line of case law could be seen as constituting a significant 
modification to the general principles of contract law which, as confirmed by the Privy Council in Reda v 
                                                          
16 Scally v Southern Health Board [1992] 1 AC 194. 
17 IBM v Dalgleish [2014] EWHC 980.  
18 Autoclenz v Belcher [2010] IRLR 70. 
19 See, for example,  Johnstone v Bloomsbury HA [1991] ICR 269.  
20 See ch 22 this volume.   
21 Cf Bournemouth University v Buckland [2011] QB 323, 336.  
    22 United Bank v Akhtar [1989] IRLR 507. 
    23 McClory v The Post Office [1993] IRLR 159. 
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Flag Ltd in 2002, held that ` an express and unrestricted power cannot in the ordinary way be 
FLUFXPVFULEHGE\DQLPSOLHGTXDOLILFDWLRQ·24 The position has evolved significantly since then and it 
now appears that the exception may have become the rule in contract as a whole (see below). There are 
though limits to the extent to which the courts will adapt the law to take account of the nature of the 
employment relationship. It is trite law that a contract will not be set aside on the basis of 
unconscionability merely because one side has exploited their superior bargaining power to conclude a 
very one-sided bargain. This position might be thought to rest rather uneasily with contemporary 
judicial recognition that employment relations are normally characterised by such a disparity of 
bargaining power.25 Nevertheless, the House of Lords made clear in National Westminster v Morgan that 
the courts will not grant relief purely on the basis of unconscionability and subsequent cases have failed 
to suggest that a judicial modification will emerge in the employment context.26 It may of course be 
said, with good reason, that other relationships would also benefit from the emergence of a common 
law concept of unconscionability but where the contract of employment is concerned the impact of 
current juridical limitations might be thought to be particularly acute.  Some other conceptual 
limitations might be thought to be more related to the ongoing nature of employment relations.  Fish v 
Dresdner Bank confirms that even if the duties imposed on one party become commercially 
impracticable to discharge, there is no obligation on the other to agree to a variation.27  
The common law tends to develop in an incremental way and a mooted innovation may not flourish if 
it seeks to move the law forward too swiftly or radically.28 A famous attempt to advance the law on 
incorporation of collectively agreed terms was the academically conceived concept of crystallised 
custom: `the parties are, in the absence of an express term to the contrary, deemed implicitly to have 
incorporated the substance of the prevailing usages or customs, [and this] remains the principal link 
EHWZHHQFROOHFWLYHDJUHHPHQWVDQGFRQWUDFWVRIHPSOR\PHQW·29 The doctrinal basis of the concept was 
never elaborated and it was, in effect, a policy device to bridge the gap between collective decision-
making and individual rights and duties. This expansive use of custom brought it into the realms of 
legal fiction and it failed to acquire judicial endorsement.   
The relationship between general principles and special rules is very much a dynamic one. A 
modification in one branch of the law may provide the catalyst for a more wide ranging reformulation 
                                                          
24 Reda v Flag Ltd [2002] IRLR 747. 
25 Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20.  
26 [1985] AC 686. See Ch 5. 
27 [2009] IRLR 1035. 
28 Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] QB 326. 
29 P.Davies and M.Freedland (eds), Kahn-)UHXQG¶V/DERXUDQGWKH/DZ (3rd edn 1983) 172. See also M. 
Freedland, `Kahn-Freund, tKH&RQWUDFWRI(PSOR\PHQWDQGWKH$XWRQRP\RI/DERXU/DZ¶LQ$%RJJHWDOQ
1) at 37.  
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of the underlying general principles. Earlier in this section I discussed case law developments in the law 
of the employment contract which modified the relationship between express and implied terms. 
Those developments can now be seen as contributing to the law as a whole moving beyond the 
position stated by the Privy Council in Reda30. One should not undervalue `the conceptual contribution 
RIODERXUODZLWVHOIWRWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKHODZ·31 Writing extra judicially Arden LJ has noted with 
particular reference to several commercial cases32 that the kind of rules which developed in the 
employment context to regulate employer discretion have evolved to become part of mainstream 
contractual doctrine: `These cases to my mind represent a turning point in our understanding of the 
impact of good faith in contract. They demonstrate that there is nothing inherently unenforceable or 
LQKHUHQWO\LPSRVVLEOHLQODZDERXWDQREOLJDWLRQWRDFWLQJRRGIDLWK·33 It is also important to appreciate 
that through the SURFHVVRICPDLQVWUHDPLQJ·WKHGHYHORSPHQWVLQWKHODZRIWKHHPSOR\PHQWFRQWUDFW
are rendered more secure. It is more difficult for a litigant to persuade a court that a modification is, in 
truth, an unsound aberration. Where mainstreaming does not occur the courts are more likely to elect 
to abandon a modification and return to regulation by general principles should circumstances change 
or the wisdom of the modification fail to stand up to scrutiny. The decision of the Supreme Court in 
Societe Generale v Geys provides an excellent example at this juncture. 34 The court had to choose between 
the elective and automatic theories of termination. The former prevailed and the outcome was 
therefore in line with a return to general principles. Geys also reminds us that the judicial vision of the 
employment relationship may vary over time. The automatic theory was consistent with a judicial view 
that  employment relations should be based upon a very strong core of employer prerogative; a 
position to which the common law has become less wedded. It is important to note that the automatic 
theory (which could be seen as specific to a relationship such as employment) could lead to 
opportunistic behaviour `The timing of the repudiation may be crucial, and if the automatic theory 
were to prevail an employer may well be tempted to play this to his advantage ² by getting in first 
before a rise in pay or pension entitlement takes place or, as in this case, a rise in the entitlement to 
                                                          
30 Reda v Flag Ltd (n 24). 
31 , ?ŽůůŝŶƐ ?ǭŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?in A. Bogg  et al (n 1) at 51. 
32 The cases referred to include The Product Star and Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [2002] 
EWCA Civ 248 and  Lymington Marina Ltd v MacNamara [2006] EWHC Ch 704. 
33 /DG\-XVWLFH$UGHQC&RPLQJWR7HUPVZLWK*RRG)DLWK¶-&/The developments in contract 
law as a whole prompted Lord Neuberger in Braganza v BP [2015] ICR 449 to question whether `trust and 
confidence would require more than what in a normal commercial context would be expected, either of [the 
employer] when carrying out the investigation, or of the court when scrutinising the investigation and its 
ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? ? 
34 Societe Generale v Geys (n 5). See ch ??. 
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ERQXVHV«·35  
Modification and Cross-fertilisation   
The dynamics of the rule making process are informed not just by the general principles of contract 
law but by developments in the law of other nominate contracts which can in turn lead to cross-
fertilisation across a wider range of contracts or even contract law as a whole.36 A good example is 
furnished by the decision in the case of Yam Seng v ITC whereby changes in a number of areas ² 
including the law of the employment contract ² prompted the court to imply a term of good faith into 
a commercial contract.37 The term was viewed as an implied term in fact as the law of commercial 
contracts was not seen to be at a stage of development whereby it could apply as a matter of generality 
and therefore be an implied term in law. 38  
Developments in the law of other nominate contracts can, of course, be borrowed to the benefit of the 
employment contract. The development of the law on sham contracts is worthy of mention. The 
conception of sham in the pivotal decision in Snook v London and West Riding Investment Ltd was 
unhelpful in the employment context as it regarded the mischief to be addressed as a common 
intention to deceive a third party.39 In the case of a relationship such as employment, which is 
hallmarked by disparity in bargaining power, it is more appropriate to focus on the capacity of the 
dominant party to adversely affect the weaker party. An influential decision on sham contracts in that 
regard was that of the House of Lords in AG Securities v Vaughan where it had to be determined 
whether the contract concerned was a lease or a license.40 The clause in issue provided that the licensor 
was entitled at any time to use the rooms together with the licensee and permit other persons to use all 
of the rooms together with the licensee. It was held that the parties never intended that the clause 
VKRXOGRSHUDWHDQGWKDWLWZDV´PHUHGUHVVLQJXSµLQDQHQGHDYRXUWRFORWKHWKHDJUHHPHQWZLWKDOHJDO
character which it would not otherwise have possessed. The effect in law was that the clause was to be 
disregarded as it was a sham. In general, behaviour subsequent to the formation of the contract is not 
relevant to its interpretation but Vaughan holds that such behaviour is relevant when determining 
whether a contractual provision is a sham.41 The advance in conceptualisation made by Vaughan came 
to the fore in Autoclenz v Belcher and allowed a decision to be arrived at which recognised the realities of 
the working arrangements.42  Public Law may also provide the catalyst for change. In Hayes v Willoughby 
                                                          
35Societe Generale v Geys (n 5).  
36 '%URGLHC)DLU'HDOLQJDQGWKH:RUOGRI:RUN¶,/- 
37 [2013] EWHC 111.  
38 This would appear to be correct: Mid Essex v Compass Group [2013] EWCA Civ 200.   
39 6HH$&/'DYLHVC6HQVLEOHWKLQNLQJDERXWVKDPWUDQVDFWLRQV¶,/- 
40 [1990] 1 A.C. 417. 
41 And see A.Bogg, `Sham Self-(PSOR\PHQWLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶,/- 
42 Autoclenz v Belcher [2011] ICR 1157. 
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/RUG6XPSWLRQREVHUYHGWKDW«5DWLRQDOLW\LVDIDPLOLDUFRQFHSWLQSXEOLFODZ,WKDVDOVRLQUHFHQW
years played an increasingly significant role in the law relating to contractual discretions, where the 
law's object is also to limit the decision-PDNHUWRVRPHUHOHYDQWFRQWUDFWXDOSXUSRVH· 43 
The Opportunities for and Perils of Further Cross-fertilisation  
It should be said that greater recourse to cross-fertilisation would have the potential to further 
evolution of the employment contract in a manner consonant with contemporary judicial recognition 
of its nature.  Where recovery for injury to feelings is concerned one of the pivotal decisions of the by-
gone age of master and servant, while the subject of cogent and persistent criticism, remains good law: 
Addis v The Gramophone Company.44 Addis serves to deny recovery for injury to feelings should the 
employment contract be breached. Elsewhere in the law of contract, the list of exceptions to Addis 
continues to lengthen; the most notable recent instance being the decision of the Lords in Farley v 
Skinner which allowed recovery where a major or important part of the contract, rather than the sole 
object, was to provide pleasure, relaxation or peace of mind.45 A departure from Addis would make a 
great deal of sense as it can be seen as representing an aberration from the general principles of 
contractual damages and constituting a barrier to contract fulfilling its normal compensatory function. 
In a similar vein in Farley, Lord Scott had stated that the issue can and should be resolved by applying 
the well-known principles laid down in Hadley v Baxendale .46 
 
The policy concerns underpinning the rules in other branches of contract law may however be at odds 
with the needs of the employment contract. This may mean that it is inappropriate to borrow doctrinal 
developments. This can be illustrated very clearly by examining how the law on implied contracts in 
commercial relationships has evolved and impacted on employment law. It will be suggested that the 
uncritical reception of those developments in the employment context has been unhelpful. Where 
commercial contracts are concerned the judgment of Bingham LJ in The Aramis has been particularly 
influential: "As the question whether or not any such contract is to be implied is one of fact, its answer 
must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case ² and the different sets of facts which 
arise for consideration in these cases are legion. However, I also agree that no such contract should be 
implied on the facts of any given case unless it is necessary to do so; necessary that is to say, in order to 
give business reality to a transaction and to create enforceable obligations between parties who are 
dealing with one another in circumstances in which one would expect that business reality and those 
                                                          
43[2013] 1 WLR 935. 
44 [1909] AC 488. 
45 Farley v Skinner [2002] 2 AC 732. 
46 (1854) 9 Exch 341. 
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enforceable obligations to exist."47 This dictum has been highly influential in the employment context; 
in part because there has been a common assumption that it is a straightforward reiteration of general 
contractual principles though it is far from clear whether this is actually the case. The approach in The 
Aramis would, in fact, appear to be a departure from orthodoxy. Earlier English cases had accepted 
that, subject to the normal burden of proof being satisfied, a contract could be inferred from the 
conduct of the parties if they demonstrated an intention to enter contractual relations. The 1920s Court 
of Appeal case of Brandt v Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co held that a contract could 
be implied from the acts of presenting a bill of lading, payment of the freight, and delivery and 
acceptance of goods specified in the bill of lading.48 The Privy Council adhered to this approach in New 
Zealand Shipping v AM Satterthwaite.49 The latter approach acknowledges that contracts are formed in a 
myriad of ways; the actings of the parties may constitute both offer and acceptance or, on occasion, 
merely acceptance. A famous example of the latter scenario is the celebrated case of Carlill v. Carbolic 
Smoke Ball Co: "why should not an offer be made to all the world which is to ripen into a contract with 
anybody who comes forward and performs the condition?"50  The approach in The Aramais seems to be 
inconsistent with a well established body of case law which recognises performance as a conventional 
mode of acceptance. 51 Adjudicating on the basis of The Aramais may defeat the reasonable 
expectations of the parties even in commercial cases. Having said that, across a range of cases, it may 
well be that such a development is appropriate in the field of commercial law. A long standing 
relationship between two commercial parties (where disparities in bargaining power will be ignored) is 
unlikely to give rise to an implied contract as the parties have chosen not to enter into an express one 
when they could readily have done so. 52  The SDUWLHV·behaviour, unlike that of their employment 
counterparts, can be assumed to be consensual and can be explained by the desire to retain flexibility in 
their choice of commercial partners. This may accord with the values of commercial law. The position 
is however different where the employment contract is concerned since : `In the field of employment it 
is not uncommon to find that a contract of employment has come into being through the conduct of 
the parties without a word being put in writing or even, on occasion, spoken. In particular, conduct 
which might not have manifested such a mutual intention had it lasted only a brief time may become 
                                                          
47 [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 213. And see the discussion in J. Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (OUP 2015) 172-
4. 
48 [1924] 1 KB 54. 
49 [1975] AC 154. 
50 [1893] 1 TB. 256, 268. 
51 The recent decision of the Supreme Court in RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Muller [2010] 1 WLR 
753 would seem to capture the general position:` unequivocal agreement can in principle be inferred from 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHVDQGFRQGXFWRIRQHSDUW\NQRZQWRWKHRWKHU¶ 
52 Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks and Spencer [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737. 
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XQHTXLYRFDOLILWLVPDLQWDLQHGRYHUZHHNVRUPRQWKV·53 Recourse to conduct can allow the reality of 
the SDUWLHV·relationship to be revealed. The ability to imply an employment contract may mean that 
workers who are in substance employees are brought within the framework of employment law.  
However in employment cases the predominance of recent authority has been resistant to wider resort 
to implied contracts. This has been partly a question of social policy; protection of agency workers for 
example has been thought to be a matter for the legislature.54 However, it has also been a result of 
borrowing from the aforementioned developments in the law of commercial contracts and, in 
SDUWLFXODUWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKHCQHFHVVLW\·WHVW55 The use of the test has made the implication of 
contracts much more unlikely in the employment context. The adoption of the approach in The Aramis 
is however out of line with the increasing significance being placed by the courts on conduct in the 
employment relationship. The courts have been willing to modify substantive and evidential rules to 
make it easier to take account of conduct to determine fundamental questions about the nature of the 
relationship and the obligations undertaken.56   
 
Changes in the External Environment  
 
Further conceptual limitations may emerge should the way in which employment relations are actually 
conducted change.  A challenge for the legal framework, in any branch of contract law, is to be able to 
respond timeously and effectively to such changes in practice. 7KHFRPPRQODZ·VUHVSRQVHWRWKHULVH
of single employer custom in the employment arena demonstrates the malleability of the common law 
and its resilience when confronted by litigation arising in a new context. The acute decline in the 
number of workers employed in traditional industries has meant that questions concerning 
incorporation of industry or trade practices are far less likely to arise nowadays. Cases of this sort 
would have been dealt with on the basis of the approach set out in Sager v Ridehalgh; i.e. the custom 
should be reasonable, certain and notorious before incorporation takes place.57 Nowadays the courts 
are far more likely to be asked to adjudicate on the status of practices which are said to arise in a 
particular firm. The test in Sager is no longer relevant and, in fact, it is now recognised that there is a 
danger that the terminology of "custom and practice" should not be allowed to obscure an enquiry into 
`what the parties must have, or must be taken to have, understood from each other's conduct and 
                                                          
53 Ajar- Tec v Stack [2014] UKEAT 0293, 32.  
54 Tilson v Alstom Transport [2011] IRLR 169.   
55 The necessity test is of course perfectly apt where implied terms in fact are in issue.   
56 Carmichael v National Power [1999] ICR 1226; Autoclenz v Belcher (n 42). 
57 [1931] 1 Ch 310.  
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words, applying ordinary contractual principles.· 58 The courts have responded constructively to the 
challenge posed by adjudication on custom which is specific to an individual employer. A not 
insignificant body of case law has emerged and those decisions may be seen as involving a return to 
first principles in that the courts have sought to resolve disputes by examining the interaction that has 
taken place between the parties and, in the light of that, seek to infer what obligations have been 
undertaken. At root a conventional offer and acceptance analysis has been deployed: ` The analysis by 
reference to offer and acceptance may seem rather artificial, as it sometimes does in this field; but it 
was not argued before us that if the employer had indeed sufficiently conveyed an intention to afford 
the benefits claimed as a matter of contract he would not thereby be bound.·59 However, the 
application of that analysis is rendered more difficult because the employer has chosen not to formalise 
a specific dimension of the employment relationship; informality is sometimes looked to as a means of 
preserving managerial prerogative. Where, for example, incentivisation of employees through payment 
of bonuses is concerned the employer may choose to operate by making ad hoc payments. No formal 
proposal will be made to vary the work-wage bargain and the act of making the payment may be 
represented as standing apart from not only the normal remuneration package but also the contractual 
framework.  By behaving in this way the employer aims to avoid regulation through the medium of 
contract law. The courts have however responded by, in the application of the offer and acceptance 
analysis, taking full account of the conduct of the parties and will determine whether that conduct 
involved supports the inference that the employer intended to be contractually bound.60  As a result, 
even the making of ad hoc payments may give rise to an ongoing contractual obligation. The employer 
wishes to retain absolute freedom of action but that may be regarded as impermissible depending upon 
the nature of the HPSOR\HH·VH[SHFWDWLRQV ZKLFKKDYHEHHQEURXJKWDERXWE\WKHHPSOR\HU·VEHKDYLRXU 
TKHHPSOR\HU·VFRQGXFWcan serve to convert reasonable expectations into enforceable obligations. 
Nevertheless the need to demonstrate that conduct amounts to acceptance gives rise to vulnerability 
IURPDQHPSOR\HH·VSHUVSHFWLYH.  The counter-argument to the assertion that implicit acceptance arises 
by the employee continuing to ZRUNZLOOEHWKDWWKHHPSOR\HH·VEHKDYLRXULVDPELJXRXV It should also 
be said that the theoretical underpinning of this development remains somewhat underdeveloped but 
may lie in unilateral contract.61 Matters would be less tenuous in a system that contained a doctrine of 
                                                          
58 Park Cakes v Shumba [2013] EWCA Civ 974. 
59 Park Cakes v Shumba (n 58).  
60 Albion Automotive v Walker [2002] EWCA Civ 946. And see D.Brodie, `Reflecting the Dynamics of 
Employment   5HODWLRQV¶2004) 33 ILJ 159. 
61 Great Northern Railway Co. v. Witham (1873) L.R. 9 C.P. 16 provides a hypothetical example relevant to the 
ZRUOGRIZRUNC,I,VD\WRDQRWKHU³,I\RXZLOOJRWR<RUN,ZLOOJLYH\RXO´WKDWLVLQDFHUWDLQVHQVHD
unilateral contract. He has not promised to go to York. But, if he goes, it cannot be doubted that he will be 
HQWLWOHGWRUHFHLYHWKHO+LVJRLQJWR<RUNDWP\UHTXHVWLVDVXIILFLHQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQIRUP\SURPLVH¶ The 
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unilateral promise and the practical difficulties involved in implicit acceptance would be avoided.  
 
The Role of Policy 
Where the law of negligence is concerned it is readily apparent and explicitly accepted that policy 
considerations inform the application of key concepts such as duty of care; the final element of the 
approach to duty in Caparo brings such arguments into play.  Policy considerations tend to more 
opaque where the law of the employment contract is concerned. However, it is important to appreciate 
that an application of many of the relevant concepts, in a manner sensitive to the needs of the 
employment relationship, is highly contingent upon the identification and application of policy factors: 
`The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, 
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good 
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.'62 Open 
textured obligations clearly invite consideration of policy factors but even more technical concepts, 
such as the doctrine of intention to enter into legal relations, are informed by the context in which they 
operate.63 The manner in which policy factors are identified, expounded and evaluated is crucial. In 
Ford Motor Co v AUEW the application of the concept of intention to enter legal relations allowed the 
court to deny a collective agreement direct legal effect and thereby promote voluntarism. 64 The 
outcome in Ford Motor Co has been seen by many commentators as highly satisfactory.65 However, 
arriving at a judicial outcome on the basis of the concept without proper regard to context may not be. 
The evolution of the law on the employment status of ministers of religion illustrates this very well. It 
is and has always been difficult to generalise given the diversity in employment patterns across different 
religious bodies but in a number of cases where a member of a religious body has claimed to be an 
employee the spiritual dimension has led to the conclusion that the parties did not intend to enter legal 
relations. A dispute involving the Methodist Church, Methodist Conference v Parfitt, was one such decision 
which was arrived at despite the explicit acknowledgement that the position of employees in general 
had changed radically since earlier litigation: `I do not for my part see any good reason why modern 
economic conditions or the development of social security and employment protection should lead to 
                                                          
old House of Lords decision in Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co may also be relevant (1877) 2 App Cas 666 
,682.  
 
62 O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (1881). 1.  
63 The decision of the Court of Appeal in Yapp v FCO [2015] IRLR 112 deals with remoteness but can be viewed 
as a policy decision to restrict recovery where psychiatric harm arises: D.Brodie (2015) 44 ILJ 270.   
64 [1969] 2 QB 303.   
65 5/HZLVC7KH/HJDO(QIRUFHDELOLW\RI&ROOHFWLYH$JUHHPHQWV¶%-,5 313. 
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DGLIIHUHQWFRQFOXVLRQQRZ·66 This position was endorsed by Lord Rodger in the Inner House in Percy v 
Church of Scotland who started `from the presumption³rebuttable, of course³that, where the 
appointment was being made to a recognised form of ministry within the Church and where the duties 
of that ministry would be essentially spiritual, there would be no intention that the arrangements made 
witKWKHPLQLVWHUZRXOGJLYHULVHWRREOLJDWLRQVHQIRUFHDEOHLQWKHFLYLOODZ·67  
The House of Lords in Percy adopted a very different stance and held that the claimant was employed 
under a contract personally to execute work within the meaning of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.68It 
should now be assumed that those involved in a working relationship should receive the protection 
afforded by modern employment law: ` The context in which these issues normally arise today is 
statutory protection for employees. Given this context, in my view it is time to recognise that 
employment arrangements between a church and its ministers should not lightly be taken as intended 
WRKDYHQROHJDOHIIHFWDQGLQFRQVHTXHQFHLWVPLQLVWHUVGHQLHGWKLVSURWHFWLRQ·69 Such relationships 
are now much more likely to be seen as multi-dimensional and recognition of the spiritual dimension 
no longer involves a denial of the temporal. Percy is a policy decision stemming from the 
acknowledgment that an exchange of services for payment, where the recipient of services has vastly 
superior bargaining power, necessitates judicial protection through the medium of contract law.70   
 
The Role of Third Parties   
Historically, and to an appreciable extent today, the content of the employment contract has not been 
derived solely through negotiation between the contracting parties but has also been the product of 
collective negotiations. Incorporation of collectively agreed terms has though been a perpetual source 
of controversy. It is clear that the appropriate terms of an agreement may be incorporated expressly or 
implicitly. A collective agreement may also constitute a custom or a usage of the trade; in which case, 
the test for incorporation remains that established many years ago in Sager v Ridehalgh. 71 The latter is an 
extremely difficult test to satisfy.72 The rigours of the test might be seen as problematic for all areas of 
contract law in so far as contracting parties have a reasonable expectation that background customs 
and usages will be incorporated. The general position does however cause particular difficulties in the 
field of employment relations given the scope for collectively agreed terms and conditions to help 
                                                          
66 [1984] QB 368. 
67 2001 SC 757. 
68 [2006] 2 AC 28.  
69Percy v Church of Scotland (n 68).  
70 It may be noted that in Percy v Church of Scotland (n 68) the claimant did not argue that a contract of 
employment existed. 
71 Sager v Ridehalgh (n 57).  
72 Davies and Freedland, (n 29) 168.  And see ch 21 this volume. 
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redress the balance of power.  
Why does the incorporation of collectively agreed terms present a problem? It should be said that the 
law of contract has traditionally displayed a considerable degree of caution, in any context, in accepting 
an argument that extraneous material constitutes a contractual obligation. This may be justified on the 
basis that the parties can be more certain about the content and extent of their obligations if they do 
not have to look beyond the body of their written agreement. Common law rules are often at pains to 
stress the importance of knowledge. For instance, tKHUHTXLUHPHQWRICUHDVRQDEOHVXIILFLHQF\RIQRWLFH·
must be satisfied before an exemption clause is incorporated and this protectionist stance serves to 
safeguard the interests of the weaker party lest unfairly prejudicial material be involved. 73 However, the 
continued unwillingness to modify or relax the traditional approach in employment cases where 
collectively agreed terms are at stake points to a very individualistic conception of the employment 
relationship. This can also be seen when the question of the appropriateness of individual terms for 
incorporation is being considered. There is a very real contrast with the treatment of documents such 
as staff handbooks which are external to the contract, but not to the employer/employee relationship, 
and tend to be viewed more readily as contractual.74 In Tomlinson v Congleton Lord Hoffmann 
emphasised the continued endurance of the individualist values of the common law. 75This is highly 
problematic where incorporation is concerned as a failure to incorporate will favour the more powerful 
party.    
 
Construction  
The employment contract largely adheres to the general canons of construction; e.g. pre-contract 
negotiations remain inadmissible76. The contemporary FRQWH[WXDORU´IDFWXDOPDWUL[µDSSURDFK
promulgated in Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich by Lord Hoffmann and pioneered by Lord 
Wilberforce in Reardon Smith Line v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen has not proved contentious in employment 
cases.77 It allows the construction of an employment contract to be informed by a wide range of 
                                                          
73 See, for example, Briscoe v Lubrizol (No 2) [2002]  EWCA Civ 508  
74 In Briscoe v Lubrizol (No 2) (n 72) at para 14 it was said that `It is of course frequently the case that details 
of an employee's contract and the benefit to which he is entitled by virtue of his employment are largely to be 
found in a handbook of the kind supplied to the claimant in this case. For this purpose, and depending upon 
the circumstances, incorporation by express reference in the statutory particulars of employment will not 
usually be required by the court. ?  
75 [2004] 1 AC 46.  
76 *0F0HHOC3ULRU1HJRWLDWLRQVDQGVXEVHTXHQWFRQGXFW¶/45 
77 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich [1998] 1 WLR 896; Reardon Smith Line v Yngvar Hansen-
Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989. 
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considerations.78 In Byrne Brothers v Baird, for example, the contract appeared to confer a right of 
delegation on the employee. In interpreting the clause in question the EAT held that employment 
practices within the industry informed the factual matrix:  ´$VDPDWWHURIFRPPRQVHQVHDQGFRPPRQ
experience, when an individual carpenter or labourer is offered work on a building site, the 
understanding of both parties is that it is he personally who will be attending to do the work. In our 
YLHZWKDWFRQVLGHUDWLRQLVDGPLVVLEOHDVSDUWRIWKHIDFWXDOPDWUL[µ79This evidence, as to the realities of 
how jobs of the sort in question are actually conducted, was relevant in categorising the nature of the 
working relationship. When the wording of the clause was construed against this background it was 
apparent that no right of delegation existed.  
 
Against a backdrop of conformity, the revisionist approach to construction adopted in Carmichael v 
National Power was a welcome development.80 There the House of Lords accepted that agreement on 
the establishment of an employment contract could be `contained partly in the letters, partly in oral 
exchanges at the interviews or elsewherHDQGSDUWO\OHIWWRHYROYHE\FRQGXFWDVWLPHZHQWRQ·3XWWLQJ
it another way the initial exchanges took their meaning from the way in which the agreement had been 
operated. 81 In contrast, in general, behaviour subsequent to the formation of a contract is not relevant 
to its interpretation. Carmichael looks to the subsequent conduct of the parties to help determine what 
they are taken to have agreed. The terms upon which employment is entered into are very much driven 
by the employer who will take responsibility for drafting the contract. Carmichael offers a modicum of 
FRQWURORYHUWKHHPSOR\HU·VSUHURJDWLYHDVEehaviour inconsistent with the original framework may 
UHVXOWLQDQRXWFRPHDWRGGVZLWKWKHHPSOR\HU·VDLP7KHUHLVVRPHGRXEWwhether, where the 
employment contract is purely in writing, Carmichael would still apply. In Carmichael Lord Hoffmann 
referred to the House of Lords case of Whitworth Street Estate v James Miller where it was held that a 
contract cannot be construed by reference to the subsequent conduct of the parties.82 Lord Reid 
famously saying that `Otherwise one might have the result that a contract meant one thing the day it 
ZDVVLJQHGEXWE\UHDVRQRIVXEVHTXHQWHYHQWVPHDQWVRPHWKLQJGLIIHUHQWDPRQWKRUD\HDUODWHU·
Two points might be made by way of response. First, in terms of doctrinal purity, it has been pointed 
out that ` Evidence of subsequent conduct does not invite a subsequent meaning. It is directed to the 
original meaning; that is, the meaning of the contract when it was signed. It is a distraction to suggest 
                                                          
78 (1998) 1 All E.R. 98. In so far as the contract is relational this might be thought to make sense. See Ch 7 this 
volume. 
79 [2002] I.R.L.R. 96 
80 Carmichael v National Power  (n 56). 
81 Carmichael v National Power  (n 56) holds that extraneous evidence is admissible to establish objectively the 
fact of the intention of the parties where the documents relied upon do not constitute the entirety of the contact. 
82 [1970] AC 583. 
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that post-contract evidence is capable of changing the contract date meaning, when its sole purpose is 
WRHOXFLGDWHWKDWPHDQLQJ·83 6HFRQG/RUG5HLG·VYLHZVPD\ZHOOFRQWLQXHWREHYDOLGLQWKHFRPPHUFLDO
law context. However, where the employment contract is concerned the manner of operation may well 
provide cogent evidence of the realities of the relationship. Sham arrangements apart, we should 
remember that it will often be highly ambiguous whether a relationship is one of employment or not. 
Again, the dynamic nature of employment relations is highly relevant: ` Agreements concerning terms 
and conditions which might be too uncertain or too illusory to enforce at a particular time in the 
relationship may by reason of the parties' subsequent conduct become sufficiently specific to give rise 
to legal rights and duties. In a dynamic«relationship new terms will be added or will supersede older 
terms.·84   
/RUG+RIIPDQQ·VMXGJPHQWLQAG of Belize v Belize Telecom may prove to be particularly significant in 
the employment context.85 He observed `that the implication of a term is an exercise in the 
FRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHLQVWUXPHQWDVDZKROH·.H\LPSOLHGWHUPVLQODZPD\EHUHOHYDQWWRTXHVWLRQVRI
interpretation. For instance, the co-operation norm possesses unfulfilled potential as a means of 
construction. In The Personal Employment Contract Freedland points to a guiding principle of construction 
which obliges the parties `to co-operate with each other in realising the objectLYHV·RIWKHFRQWUDFW86  I 
would suggest that this principle may be particularly helpful where the work-wage bargain is concerned. 
For instance, the employment contract may contain income protection clauses where the benefits are 
contingent upon the beneficiary retaining the status of employee. In some situations the employee will 
be concerned that the employer will seek to terminate the contract to avoid incurring the cost of, for 
example, income protection benefits. As a result of Johnson, there would be no implied restraint on the 
notice clause but, when the contract is read as a whole, it may be apparent that the employer has 
restricted his capacity to terminate. In Reda it was said that `even if the case is taken as a rare example 
of a term being implied into a contract to qualify an express right, the justification for this course 
OD\LQWKHQHHGWRUHFRQFLOHH[SUHVVWHUPVRIWKHFRQWUDFWZKLFKZHUHPXWXDOO\LQFRQVLVWHQW¶.87 In 
addition, it would be possible to establish that it was implicit in a clause dealing with income protection 
in respect of ill health that, should the employer terminate the claimant's employment for that very 
reason, the claimant would continue to be entitled to benefit.88 Such an implicit restraint may be 
                                                          
83 Wholescale Distributor v Gibbons [2008] 1 NZLR 277. And see  D.McLauchlan `Contract Interpretation: 
:KDWLVLWDERXW"¶6\GQH\/DZ5HYLHZ.   
84 Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 11. 
85 [2009] 1 WLR 1988. 
86 M.R. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract, (OUP 2003)  141. 
87 6HHWKH3ULY\&RXQFLO¶VH[SODQDWLRQRIAspden v Webbs Poultry [1996] IRLR 521 in Reda v Flag Ltd 
(Bermuda) (n 24). 
88 Briscoe v Lubrizol [2002] IRLR 607 
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necessary to ensure that employees gain the full benefit of the work-wage bargain. The guiding 
principle allows the contract to be construed so that income protection arises where the individual has 
the status of employee or that status has been lost because the very contingency arose that the scheme 
was meant to guard against.    
 
Further Developments  
It seems clear that the general principles of the law of contract will continue to have a pivotal role in 
the development of the law of the employment contract and the resolution of hitherto unresolved 
controversies.89 The range of issues thrown up by a relationship such as employment is extensive; 
moreover as social and economic conditions change further challenges emerge. It would be foolish to 
restrict the extent of contractual doctrine that is seen as being relevant to the creation of solutions to 
problems that arise in the industrial relations context. Concepts of seemingly limited importance can 
play a major role in the development of the employment contract. The duty of co-operation performed 
that function in both assisting and legitimising the emergence of the implied obligation of mutual trust 
and confidence. 90  In Stirling v Maitland the former duty was stated in the following terms: `If a party 
enters into an arrangement which can only take effect by the continuance of an existing state of 
DIIDLUV«WKHUHLVDQLPSOLHGHQJDJHPHQWRQKLVSDUWWKDWKHVKDOOGRQRWKLQJRIKLVRZQPRWLRQWRSXW
an end WRWKDWVWDWHRIFLUFXPVWDQFHV·91 Mutual trust and confidence, with its positive dimension, could 
be presented as a modification of that overarching norm.92 Further recourse to the obligation of co-
operation may be advantageous. Sedley LJ, in Cerberus Software Ltd v Rowley, drew attention to `one of 
the great unresolved questions of employment law: is it ever open to a wrongfully dismissed employee 
WRDIILUPWKHFRQWUDFWDQGVXHIRUZDJHV"·93 Despite the endorsement of the theory of elective 
termination in Geys v Societe Generale this question remains unresolved: `even if the question can be said 
to be unresolved, this court is not invited to resolve it·. 94 It should be said that as matters stand the 
employee will be restricted to a claim in damages.95 Of course, the reason wages cannot be earned is 
because the employer has wrongfully denied the employee the opportunity to do so. The following 
                                                          
89 Developments in the law of tort should not be lost sight of. Decisions such as Viasystems v Thermal Transfer 
[2006] QB 510 may impact on the law of the employment contract. And see the discussion in Prassl (n 47) 186-
7.  
90 The obligation probably has its origin in the general duty of co-operation between contracting parties: 
B.A.  Hepple , Employment Law, 4th ed. (1981), paras. 291-292, pp. 134-135. 
91 (1864) 5 B & S 840, 852 and approved by the House of Lords in Southern Foundries v Shirlaw [1940] AC 
701.  
92 Bournemouth & Boscombe AFC v Manchester United FC, The Times, May 22, 1980.  
93 [2001] ICR 376, 386.   
94 Geys v Societe Generale (n 5). 
95 Denmark Productions Ltd v Boscobel Productions Ltd [1969] 1 QB 699, 726. 
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dictum of Sir John Donaldson is highly pertinent at this point: `Why should not the servant sue for 
wages if it is the act of the employer which has prevented his performing the condition precedent of 
rendering services? And if he can sue in debt for his wages, no duty to mitigate would arise and there 
would be no practical necessity to accept a wrongful dismissal as terminating the contract of 
employment, provided that the employer is solvent and the servant is sure that the dismissal was 
ZURQJIXO·96 The learned judge supported this stance by reference to the House of Lords decision in 
Mackay v Dick which involved the application of the general obligation of co-operation97. There the 
seller of a digging machine agreed that he would demonstrate that it could achieve a specified standard 
of performance and that this demonstration should be a condition precedent to his right to be paid the 
price. The buyer prevented the demonstration taking place and the House of Lords held that in such 
circumstances he was entitled to be paid the price not just damages. 7KLVZDVEHFDXVHWKHVHOOHU·V
obligation was complete either when he demonstrated that the performance target could be met or he 
was prevented from doing so. Contemplating extending this approach to the employment context Sir 
John Donaldson opined that `the fact that the servant has not rendered the service would be no 
obstacOHLQVXLQJIRUZDJHVLILWZDVWKHHPSOR\HU
VDFWZKLFKSURGXFHGWKLVVWDWHRIDIIDLUV·98 One 
might cavil that there is certainly no obstacle to the employee suing but what is the nature of the 
action? The elective principle is subject to the limitation that ` the innocent party must also perform its 
contractual obligations if it is to earn the right to claim the price that is due to be paid by the party in 
breach. If the innocent party cannot earn the right to claim the price due to it for its performance 
without the co-operation of the party in breach, it will not be able to pursue a debt claim and will be 
OLPLWHGWRDFODLPLQGDPDJHV·It may be said that the consequence of refusing to allow the employee to 
perform is simply that there arises a secondary obligation to pay compensation (damages) for non-
performance of a primary obligation.99 However, the later analysis is avoided if the work wage bargain 
is constructed so that wages become due both where work is performed but also where the employer 
wrongfully prevents performance. In either case the employee becomes entitled to payment of wages. 
This construction is the result of the application of the guiding principle of co-operation. Such a 
construction is also supported by the categorisation of an employment contract as relational.100 This 
points towards the obligations of the contract being framed in a manner that is supportive of the 
relationship continuing; ` harmonisation of relational conflict·LVSURPRWHG.101 Forcing the employee to 
look to the law of damages brings into play the law on mitigation of loss. As matters stand where the 
                                                          
96 Sanders v Neale  [1974] ICR 565, 571.  
97 (1881) 6 App.Cas 251.   
98 Sanders v Neale  ( n 96) 571. 
99 Photo Production v Securicor [1980] AC 827 
100 Johnson v Unisys (n 2). 
101 See I. Macneil, The New Social Contract  and ch 5 
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employee has been denied the opportunity to work, notwithstanding the triumph of the elective theory, 
he ` must almost invariably be bound to seek other employment in fulfilment of that obligation; it 
would be very rarely that he could expect to find other employment, or could mitigate his damages in 
any other way·102 The pressure to avoid the amount of compensation being decreased directs the 
HPSOR\HH·VIRFXVDZD\IURPSUHVHUYDWLRQRIWKHHPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQVKLS103 
 
Prudent recourse to general principles is crucial to the successful development of the law of the 
employment contract; conversely there are dangers in developing rules without proper regard to 
overarching principles. The manner in which the concept of mutuality of obligation has emerged offers 
a cogent warning here. In a seminal judgment in Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions McKenna J 
stated that ` That a contract of service existed if (a) the servant agreed in consideration of a wage or 
other remuneration to provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his 
PDVWHU·DQGWZRIXUWKHUFRQGLWLRQVZHUHVDWLsfied. 104 The first condition transmuted into a requirement 
that before a contract of employment came into being there should be an exchange of obligations as to 
future performance. This was unnecessary as MacKenna J can best be understood as talking about the 
requirement for consideration. The effect though has been to make it more difficult for particularly 
vulnerable groups to establish employment status. It is important to recognise that the blame for this 
cannot be laid at the door of the general law of contract as it is not a requirement of contractual 
relations that mutuality of obligation exists with respect to future performance.105 Nevertheless, the 
courts elaborated on the essential requirements of an employment contract to produce a concept of 
mutuality of obligation particular to employment relations. Had greater regard been had to general 
principles it is more than conceivable that this would not have happened. Freedland has suggested that 
the concept of mutuality of obligation can be best thought of as a way of expressing the requirement 
for consideration in the language of promissory obligations.106 This is extremely helpful. So expressed, 
mutuality of obligation can be seen as a requirement rooted in the mainstream body of contractual 
doctrine. The practical consequence of relocating mutuality of obligation within the four walls of the 
concept of consideration is that a broader range of case law become relevant. Thus Freedland rightly 
draws attention to the fact that the contemporary articulation of mutuality of obligation is inconsistent 
with traditional acceptance that a right to lay off is not incompatible with ongoing relations. On the 
                                                          
102 Gunton [1981] Ch 448, 468.  
103 S.Rowan, Remedies for Breach of Contract, 100. 
104 [1968] 2 QB 497.  
105 Cornwall CC v Prater [2006] ICR 731. 
106 Freedland, (n 86). And see N.CountourLVC8VHVDQG0LVXVHVRIC0XWXDOLW\RI2EOLJDWLRQV¶DQGWKH
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Freedland  analysis such a line of case law becomes relevant in cases where work is performed on an 
intermittent basis. The reconciliation of the requirement for mutuality and the HPSOR\HH·Vneed for 
continuity is then fully addressed.  
 
Conclusions  
This chapter has been premised on the basis that the relationship between general principles and the 
rules of the employment contract is not a straightforward one and a proper understanding can only be 
gained through consideration of the way in which the law of the employment contract also interacts 
with the law of other nominate contracts. The common law responds to the need for change by 
drawing not only on general principles but also on developments in all areas of contract law. 
Considerable scope exists for judicial creativity; in terms of modification of existing concepts or, in 
effect, the creation of new ones.  Modification may well be to the benefit of the employee as we know 
from observing the transmutation of the implied obligation of co-operation into mutual trust and 
confidence.  
Underlying notions of pluralism allow overarching principles to be fashioned to the needs of particular 
relationships. The common law is capable of considerable flexibility. Satisfactory evolution is very 
much contingent on regard being had to policy factors and matters become tendentious on occasion. 
There are other features of contracting in the employment sphere that require careful attention. A key 
issue is where, as is typically the case, the employer·Vassumes responsibility for the drafting of the 
contract. 7KHHPSOR\HU·VFRQWURORYHUWKHSURFHVVRIIRUPDOLVDWLRQUHTXLUHVWKHFRXUWVWRJXDUGDJDLQVW
abuse; decisions to formalise and not to formalise are equally relevant in this respect.107 Resort to 
formalisation allows the employer to present the bargain in a particular way; failure to do so may take 
an aspect of the employment relationship out with the contractual framework. Successful regulation 
requires an employment orientated approach to evidential and substantive rules.  The courts have made 
a great deal of progress here through decisions such as Carmichael v National Power and Albion 
Automotive v Walker.108   
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